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Abstract
This paper attempts, first, to give an overview of the economic development of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in the postwar period (especially since the 1960s)
from both macro and industry levels and, then, to investigate their prospects of attaining the
status of NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) in the near future. The latter topic is
discussed in the light of the concepts of NICs employed by GECD [1979] and B. Balassa
[1981]. A brief outlook is given for the Thai economy, as Thailand is regarded as the most
typical near-NIC among these four.
I Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to give an
overview of the economic development of In-
donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
in the postwar period (especially since the
1960s) from both macro and industry levels,
and to investigate their prospects of attaining
the status of NICs (Newly Industrializing Coun-
tries) in the near future. These four countries
are members of ASEAN (Association of South-
East Asian Nations), which was founded in
1967, and so will be called "ASEAN4" through-
out this paper. 1) The term "NICs" is used here
rather than the term "NIEs (Newly Industrializ-
* iI_:J't~, The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
1) The two remaining member countries of
ASEAN, i.e., Singapore and Brunei, are not
considered here, because the former already
belongs to the group of NICs and the latter,
which joined ASEAN in 1984, is a very small
country with a population of only 230,000 people
(but with an income of more than 15,000 US
dollars due to oil).
ing Economies)" to maintain consistency with
OECD [1979; 1988], but "NICs" should be
replaced by "NIEs" in referring to Taiwan and
Hong Kong.
As a methodology for analyzing the economic
development of ASEAN4, I shall employ the
theory of dualistic development. 2) By this
theory, economic development in each of the
ASEAN4 countries is understood as the proc-
ess in which the center of gravity of growth
shifts from primary sectors (particularly agricul-
ture) to non-primary ones (particularly manufac-
turing or industry). Here, the industrial sector
is considered as the leading sector for
development. 3) Its growth leads the growth of
2) See Lewis [1954], Jorgenson [1961], Fei and
Ranis [1964], etc. for the theory of dualistic
development See Yasuba [1980: Ch. 5] and
Watanabe [1986] for the dualistic analyses of
Japanese and Asian development, respectively.
3) Riddle [1986], for example, emphasizes service-
led growth, but the possibility of the service
sector becoming a dynamic engine for develop-
ment seems to be small since most of its prod-
ucts are non-tradables and its technological /'
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the whole economy but must be supported by a
corresponding expansion in exports. This is
because industrial development requires im-
ports of industrial raw materials and capital
goods and, in general, exportation makes im-
portation possible.
Exportation, which supports the growth and
development of the whole economy including
the industrial sector, may be made either by the
industrial sector itself (i. e., exports of manufac-
tured goods) or by the primary sector (i. e.,
exports of primary commodities). The Asian
NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore), which are poor in natural resources, all
pursued outward-looking, export-oriented in-
dustrialization from the beginning, and achieved
rapid development due to a favorable expan-
sionary circle of exports and investment, which
may be schematized as follows: exports of
manufactured goods - imports of intermediate
and capital goods - investment - productivity
increase - (import substitution) _ exports. 4)
On the other hand, ASEAN4 countries are
rich in natural resources and their industrializa-
tion depends to varying extents on the exporta-
tion of primary commodities. However, with
the steady decline in prices of primary commod-
ities, including oil, from the beginning of the
1980s, these countries are now facing the cru-
cial problem in their drive toward industrializa-
tion of how to reduce their dependence on
primary exports, on the one hand, and how to
realize the expansionary circle of manufacturing
'\i dynamism is not so strong as in the industrial
sector. See Yoshihara [1988: Ch. 5] for the
importance of technology and trade in economic
development.
4) See Watanabe [1989: Ch. 4] for the details of
this mechanism.
exports and investment, on the other. 5)
Economic development of ASEAN4 by dec-
ade since the 1960s may be characterized
generally as follows from the point of view of
industrialization: "import substitution" in the
1960s, "import substitution and export orienta-
tion" in the 1970s, and "structural adjustments"
in the 1980s. This characterization describes
the average path of development or indus-
trialization, and each of the four countries does,
of course, deviate to some extent from the
average path. For example, the import-
substitution phase began as early as in the
1950s in the Philippines. The phase of import
substitution and/or export orientation came a
decade later than average in Indonesia. Further-
more, structural adjustments are quite different
in substance between the four countries.
The most important characteristic of each
economy in relation to its development over
these decades can be expressed in the following
key words: "oil" for Indonesia, the "New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP)" for Malaysia, "debt crisis"
for the Philippines, and "stable growth led by
the private sector" for Thailand. "Oil" means
Indonesia's heavy dependence on petroleum in
the past and its recent efforts to overcome this
dependence. "NEP" means Malaysia's pursuit
for equity through the bumiputra policy, prob-
ably at the cost of efficiency in the short-run.
"Debt crisis" symbolizes an economic malfunc-
5) Ichimura [1988] classifies Asian countries into
five types in terms of economic development:
(1) resource-poor NICs, (2) resource-rich
ASEAN4, (3) agricultural South Asia, (4) gigantic
China and India, and (5) socialist countries; and
he proposes different development strategies for
the different types of economies. The analysis
herein is similar to the strategy proposed for the
resource-rich ASEAN4.
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tion in the Philippines which led to the collapse
of the national economy at the end of the
Marcos period. "Stable growth led by the pri-
vate sector" indicates balanced economic man-
agement and moderate but steady growth in
Thailand.
Section II of this paper reviews briefly the
economic levels, growth performance, struc-
tural changes, and commodity problems of the
ASEAN4 countries based on Tables 1, 2, 3 and
4 and Fig. 1. Section III discusses in some
detail the prospects of ASEAN4 of becoming
NICs, based mainly on tables 5 and 6. Finally,
Section IV gives briefly the outlook for the Thai
economy, as Thailand is regarded as the most
typical near-NIC among the ASEAN4 countries.
II An Overview of the Development
of ASEAN4 Countries
Table 1 summarizes such basic indicators as
population, area, GDP, and so on for the
ASEAN4 countries, Japan, and the United
States in comparable terms. The table shows
that, as of 1988, the total economic size of
ASEAN4 in terms of GDP is only 4% of that of
USA (7% ofJapan), while the average income in
terms of per capita GDP is also only 4% of that
Table 1 Basic Indicators of ASEAN4
































































































































































Notes: 1$ means 'international dollar'. It is a theoretical measuring unit to be used in the multi-country
comparisons of purchasing power parity (PPP) and its conversion rate with US$ is one (1.0).
PPP-related data are derived from the PC diskettes which correspond to Tables 1 and 2 in Summers
and Heston [1988]. Figures marked with # for Indonesia are estimated approximately by the
author based on the PPP data for 1980 compiled by the UN Commission of the European
Communities (See UNCEC [1986] or Kurabayashi and Sakuma [1990]) as weD as on the GOP
deflators of Indonesia and USA.
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of USA (3% of Japan). This low level of
ASEAN4 as compared with the United States
or Japan is partly due to the exchange rate used
in international comparison. The table also
shows the rates of deviation between exchange
rates and purchasing power parities for
ASEAN4, which indicate a huge undervaluation
of the exchange rate vis-a-vis the purchasing
power parity (i. e., from 68% for Indonesia to
52% for Malaysia). When the comparison is
made based on the purchasing power parity, the
total GDP of ASEAN4 increases significantly
(almost three times) as shown in the lower part
of Table 1, exceeding the total GDP of Asian
NICs by 60% (but 5% less based on the ex-
change rate conversion). 6) Average per capita
GDP of ASEAN4, however, is only 12% of
USA, indicating still a large income gap in spite
of the upward revaluation of income by three
times based on the purchasing power parity. 7)
Table 2 summarizes in comparable terms the
average growth rates of GDP and its compo-
nents for each decade for ASEAN4 and other
selected countries or groups of countries.
Three major facts concerning the growth per-
formance of ASEAN4 emerge from the table.
First, the 1970s was a period of high growth,
while the 1980s (at least until the middle of the
6) Data for Asian NICs were also obtained from the
PC diskettes of Sununers and Heston [1988].
7) The income disparity between countries of this
size may not be surprising if we consider the
domestic income disparity between poor and rich
households. Average income of the top 10 per-
cent is approximately five times that of the bot-
tom 20 percent in Japan (1979), eleven times in
the United States (1985), eight times in Malaysia
(1987), and six times in both Indonesia (1987,
expenditure) and the Philippines (1985, expendi-
ture), Calculation here is based on World Bank,
World Development Report 1990, Table 30.
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decade) was a period of stagnation or low
growth. This is also generally true for the other
countries. Second, all the countries in ASEAN4
showed much better growth perfonnance in the
1970s than any of the other countries or
groups. This rapid growth was led by the
industrial sector, especially the manufacturing
industry. Third, the perfonnances of the four
countries diverged in the 1980s. The Philip-
pines dropped behind the rest of the group due
mainly to political turmoils and debt crisis. The
remaining three all suffered from recession in
the industrialized countries in the early 1980s as
well as from stagnation in primary commodity
prices almost throughout the decade, but still
maintained better perfonnance than most of the
other countries and groups. 8)
The ASEAN4 countries (except for Indone-
sia) changed their industrialization strategy from
'import substitution' to 'export promotion' (plus
import substitution) around 1970.9) In Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand, this change was
given momentum by legislation to promote ex-
ports, including acts covering investment incen-
tives, export incentives, and export processing
zones, in the period from 1967 to 1972. In-
donesia also introduced similar acts from 1967
to 1970 but mainly for the purpose of import
substitution. In Indonesia, export promotion
began to be stressed only after the sharp de-
cline in oil price of March 1983.
As Table 3 shows, the manufacturing indus-
try increased its share in GDP steadily from
1970 to 1988 (or 1987) in each of the ASEAN4
8) Countries with GDP growth rate exceeding 6.0%
(Thailand) for 1980-88 include China (10.3%),
Pakistan (6.5%), Yemen (6.5%), Korea (9.9%),
Oman (12.7%), and Hong Kong (7.3%).
9) See, for example, Yamazawa and Hirata [1987]
for details.
countries due to rapid growth, especially in the
1970s. The share of manufactured goods (SITe
5-9) in exports also increased steadily and
rapidly in all of the four countries (though
mostly in the 1980s in the case of Indonesia).
The Philippines' achievement seems to be a
little misleading because of the unusually high
share of SITC 9, most of which consists of
production by consignment with a limited
amount of net foreign exchange earnings. 10)
The employment structure seems to be a prob-
lem in that the share of manufacturing in total
employment is still very low compared with the
share in total production (GDP), indicating the
low absorptive capacity of the sector in most
cases.
Table 3 also indicates that ASEAN4 still de-
pends heavily on the exports of primary com-
modities (SITC 0 to 4 including processed
food), 11) though the Philippines can probably be
regarded as an exception. Furthennore, the
share of exports in GDP on the expenditure
side is remarkably high in Malaysia and fairly
high in Thailand, so that prices of primary com-
modities are expected to have had significant
effects on economic growth in the ASEAN4
countries other than the Philippines. This can
be confirmed by Fig. 1, which shows fairly
strong correlations between GDP growth and
changes in primary commodity prices.
Malaysia's correlation is steady and strong as is
10) Such a production process is also limited in its
linkages with other domestic industries and the
extent of technology transfer. Malaysia faces
more or less the same problem.
11) Note that exports of tin or copper ores and
concentrates are classified as SITC 28 but those
of their products as SITC 68. Most of the SITC
68 in ASEAN4 may be regarded as primary
commodity exports.
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Table 3 Structural Changes of ASEAN4 (Over Time Changes in Shares, %)
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1970 1980 1987 1970 1980 1988 1970 1980 1988 1970 1980 1988
GOP (nominal)
Agriculture 47 25 26 32 23 21 28 23 23 28 25 17
Industry 18 43 33 25 36 40 30 37 34 25 29 35
Mining 5 26 13 6 10 10 3 3 2 2 2 3
Manufacturing 9 12 14 12 20 24 23 24 25 16 20 24
Services 35 32 41 43 41 39 43 40 44 46 46 48
Employment
Agriculture 56 54 53 37 31 54 51 46 71 64
Mining 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 0
Manufacturing 9 9 9 16 16 12 11 10 8 8
Others 34 36 35 46 52 34 37 43 21 28
Exports (f. o. b.) (987)
SITC 0-2,4 62 22 23 66 47 38 85 60 31 77 76 42
SITC 3 31 74 50 7 24 20 2 1 2 0 1 1
SITC 5-8 2 4 25 26 28 42 9 24 37 16 20 57
(SITC 7) (0) 0) 0) (2) (11) (26) (0) (2) (0) (0) (6) (6)
SITC9 5 0 2 1 1 1 4 16 30 7 4 1
Imports (c. i. f. ) (987) (1987)
SITC 0-2,4 14 17 14 29 16 15 16 12 13 10 10 12
SITC 3 1 16 10 12 15 7 11 28 19 9 31 7
SITC 5-8 73 67 75 58 68 77 69 49 47 77 55 78
(SITC 7) (30) (34) (39) (28) (39) (45) (34) (24) (7) (35) (23) (40)
SITC9 11 0 1 1 1 1 3 11 22 4 3 2
Expenditures/GOP (1973) (987)
Private consumption 81 61 61 55 51 47 70 67 73 68 64 61
Gov. consumption 9 10 10 16 17 14 8 8 9 12 12 11
Gross investment 14 21 26 24 32 29 21 31 17 26 27 28
Exports 13 31 26 42 58 67 19 20 24 17 25 34
Imports -16 -22 -23 -36 -55 -57 -19 -26 -24 -22 -30 -36
Notes: Oata source is Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB
(various issues). Sectoral GOP for Malaysia in 1980 and 1987 is obtained by calculation based on
real values at constant 1978 prices due to the lack of nominal data. Expenditure shares for the
Philippines and Thailand do not add up to one due to statistical discrepancies. SITC is the
abbreviation of Standard International Trade Classification, where SITC O=food and live animals,
SITC 1= beverages and tobacco, SITC 2= crude materials, SITC 3 = mineral fuels, SITC 4 = animal
and vegetable oils and fats, SITC 5=chemicals and related products, SITC 6=manufactured goods
classified chiefly by materials, SITC 7= machinery and transport equipment, SITC 8 = miscellaneous
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expected. Its correlation coefficients are about
0.6 for both the 1970s and 1980s. Correlation
coefficients indicate bilateral relations but not
causal ones. However, we may be able to
interpret the results in a causal way from price
changes to economic growth since primary
commodity prices are, in general, an external
exogenous factor to each of the ASEAN4 coun-
tries.
Primary commodity prices are strongly
correlated with world income or world demand,
which is also an important external exogenous
factor to ASEAN4. Taking changes in these
two exogenous factors as external shocks on
the balance of payments, Table 4 evaluates
these shocks quantitatively by decomposing
them into four policy responses or adjustments,
through which the shocks are absorbed, for the
four countries of ASEAN4, selected NICs, and
Japan. Note that real (i. e., relative) prices of
Table 4 External Shocks and Policy Responses (%)
Balance of Payments Effects Policy Responses or Adjustments
Tenns of Export Total Increase Import Reduction Added
trade volume external in export substi- in imports external
effects effects shocks market tution through lower finance
share GDP growth
Indonesia
(A) 1974-82 83.6 16.4 100.0 [ 23.6] 2.3 -1.1 0.5 -101. 7
(B) 1974-83 113.0 -13.0 100.0 [ 13.2] 17.0 -20.0 4.0 -101.0
Malaysia
(A) 1974-82 71.6 28.4 100.0 [ 6.4] 39.9 -25.4 4.3 -118.8
Philippines
(A) 1974-82 -75.1 -24.9 100.0 [-14.5] 17.5 2.3 -2.6 82.9
(B) 1974-83 -76.7 -23.3 100.0 [-18.6] 0.0 0.2 0.4 99.2
Thailand
(A) 1974-82 -90.1 -9.9 100.0 [-15.2] 25.5 8.6 2.6 63.4
(B) 1974-83 -73.4 -26.6 100.0 [-12.0] 16.1 26.1 2.4 55.4
Singapore
(A) 1974-82 -98.1 -1.9 100.0 [-46.3] 67.0 -41.8 17.5 57.2
Korea
(A) 1974-82
-83.2 -16.8 100.0 [-13.3] 104.5 17.1 4.6 -26.2
(B) 1974-83 -74.0 -26.0 100.0 [ -6.9] 89.0 135.0 -32.0 -92.0
(C) 1973-83 -89.0 -11.0 100.0 [ - ] 80.0 27.0 12.0 -19.0
Taiwan
(A) 1974-82 -43.8 -56.2 100.0 [-24.8] 132.9 16.3 13.5 -62.7
(B) 1974-83 -41.0 -59.0 100.0 [ -6.5] 10.0 35.0 131.0 -76.0
Brazil
(B) 1974-83 -82.0 -18.0 100.0 [ -2.7] 15.0 67.0 -10.0 27.0
Mexico
(B) 1974-83 -63.0 -37.0 100.0 [ -1.3] -28.0 -102.0 25.0 205.0
Japan
(C) 1973-83 -87.0 -13.0 100.0 [ - ] 38.0 41.0 85.0 -64.0
Notes: See Balassa [1981] for methodology and the decomposition fonnula. Results (A) are derived from
Naya, Kim and James [1984], while (B) from Torigoe [1986] and (C) from P. Kuznets [1985].
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primary commodities are replaced by terms of
trade (i.e., export prices/import prices). Note
also that the analysis here covers from 1973/74
to 1982/83, which includes only the period of oil
price hikes that resulted in an external bonanza
for Indonesia and Malaysia but negative exter-
nal shocks for the Philippines and Thailand. As
to the policy responses to external shocks,
Thailand's response is in striking contrast to
that of the Philippines. In Thailand, world mar-
ket penetration and import substitution played
significant roles in the absorption of shocks, and
the dependence on external borrowing was lim-
ited to one half to two-thirds of the total
shocks. On the other hand, the Philippine de-
pendence on external borrowing is 80 to 100%.
The Thai behavior looks somewhat like the
behavior of Korea or Taiwan, where the adjust-
ments by world market penetration and import
substitution are quite significant and large. 12)
III Prospects of ASEAN4 for NIC Status
III-I. Definition ofNICs (Newly Industrializ-
ing Countries )
Is it possible for ASEAN4 (i. e., Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) to be-
come NICs in the near future? Or are they
already NICs? To answer this question, we
must discuss first what NIC really means or
what is the definition of NIC. The tenn "NICs"
appeared first in OECD [1979], in which ten
middle-income developing countries were taken
12) Such adjustments are large enough to reduce
external debts or to increase external assets.
The decomposition analysis for the 1980s is in-
teresting and seems to be especially important
for Indonesia and Malaysia, which faced severe
external shocks caused by drastic declines in oil
and other primary commodity prices.
as examples of NICs, i.e., Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. Ana-
lyzing their rapid industrialization in the 1960s
and 1970s as well as their impacts on OECD
countries, 13) the report points out four charac-
teristics which are common to these ten coun-
tries. (1) They are pursuing an outward-looking
growth policy (promotion of growth by ex-
ports). (2) They are increasing their shares in
world industrial production and exports. (3)
Domestically, they are increasing the shares of
manufacturing industry in total production, total
exports and total employment. (4) They are
rapidly reducing the gap in their per capita
income (real GDP) vis-a-vis the industrialized
countries. These are the dividing lines drawn
by OECD between NICs and the other LDCs.
NIC status is not, of course, regarded as
constant: some countries may leave the group,
while new members may enter.
Another definition has been given by Balassa
[1981], when he analyzed quantitatively (as in
Table 4) how the NICs coped with the first oil
shock and the world recession during the period
1974-78. In the analysis, he selected as NICs
the countries (1) with per capita income higher
than 1,100 US dollars in 1978, and (2) with the
share of manufacturing industry in GDP higher
13) The OECD report of 1979 analyzes the develop-
ment of NICs from the point of view of the
challenge and menace to DECD countries in
production and employment. The report, how-
ever, reaches the conclusion that DECD gained
more than it lost due to positive effects of inter-
dependence. On the other hand, an interesting
point in the recent report (DECD [1988]) is the
analysis based on the theories of dynamic com-
parative advantage and product cycle that the
challenge of NICs is caused partIy by DECD
itself through direct foreign investment.
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Table 5 Comparisons of Per Capita GDP: ASEAN4 versus NICs
Comparison by ER (US$ in current prices)
(exchange rate) 1970 1978 1980 1985
Indonesia 75 257 490 509
Malaysia 318 1,185 1,718 1,953
Philippines 200 530 732 599
Thailand 180 520 720 745
Singapore 915 3,319 4,701 8,529
Korea 266 1,287 1,531 1,980
Taiwan 384 1,528 2,252 3,027
Brazil 456 1,798 2,059 1,733
Mexico 722 1,563 2,685 2,247
Greece 1,130 3,352 4,174 3,357
Spain 1,090 3,994 5,679 4,344
Comparison by PPP (1$ in current prices)
(purchasing power) 1970 1978 1980 1985
Indonesia (US = 100) 315( 6) 829( 8) 1,096( 9) 1,585(10)
Malaysia (US = 100) 705(15) 2,186(23) 3,112(27) 4,050(25)
Philippines (US = 100) 572(12) 1,228(13) 1,551(14) 1,710(11)
Thailand (US = 100) 550(11) 1,322(14) 1,694(15) 2,310(14)
Singapore (US = 100) 1,557(32) 4,312(45) 5,817(51) 11,183(70)
Korea (US= 100) 606(13) 2,076(22) 2,369(21) 3,734(23)
Taiwan (US= 100) 770(16) 2,233(23) 2,921(26) 4,422(28)
Brazil (US = 100) 885(18) 2,544(26) 3,356(29) 3,979(25)
Mexico (US = 100) 1,517(31) 3,084(32) 4,333(38) 4,739(30)
Greece (US= 100) 1,478(31) 3,565(37) 4,383(38) 5,703(36)
Spain (US = 100) 2,261(47) 4,777(50) 6,131(54) 7,879(49)
Comparison by PPP (1$ at constant 1980 prices)
(purchasing power) 1970 1978 1980 1985
Indonesia 643 983 1,096 1,223
Malaysia 1,525 2,717 3,112 3,415
Philippines 1,094 1,468 1,551 1,361
Thailand 1,063 1,590 1,694 1,900
Singapore 2,869 4,986 5,817 9,834
Korea 1,189 2,411 2,369 3,056
Taiwan 1,514 2,635 2,921 3,581
Brazil 1,782 3,030 3,356 3,282
Mexico 3,063 3,822 4,333 3,985
Greece 2,952 4,262 4,383 4,464























































Notes: 1$ (international dollar) is a theoretical concept used in multi-country comparison of purchasing
power parity (PPP). Its conversion rate with US$ is one (1.0) for the benchmark year.
PPP-related data are derived from Summers and Heston [1988]. Data for Indonesia are extrapo-
lated by using GDP deflators and real GDP growth based on the 1980 PPP compiled by UNCEC
[1986]. Data for other ASEAN countries in 1987 are also extrapolated similarly based on the 1985
PPPs.
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than 20% in 1977. Though his'tenninology is
not NICs but NIDCs (Newly-Industrializing De-
veloping Countries) and his selection of coun-
tries is a little different from that of OECD
[1979], his definition seems worth considering
here.
III-2. Current Situation ofASEAN4
Key indicators for ASEAN4 corresponding to
the definitions of NICs by OECD and Balassa
above are summarized in Tables 5 and 6, which
allow consistent comparisons between the four
countries of ASEAN and most of the NICs in
Table 6 Comparison of Production and Export Structures: ASEAN4 versus NICs
(%)
Shares of Shares of Shares of
manufacturing industry industry
in total in total in total
production (GDP) production (GDP) employment
1978 1988 1978 1988 1978 1981
Indonesia 9 19 33 36 11 12
Malaysia 17 19* 32 35* 16 16
Philippines 25 25 35 34 16 17
Thailand 18 24 27 35 8 9
Singapore 26 30 35 38 38 39
Korea 24 32 36 43 37 29
Taiwan 38 48 37
Brazil 28 29 37 43 22 24
Mexico 28 26 37 35 26 26
Greece 19 18 31 29 28 28
Spain 30 27 38 37 43 40
Shares of Shares of Shares ofmanufacturing textiles and machinery andgoods in clothing transporttotal exports equipment
1977 1988 1977 1988 1977 1988
Indonesia 2 29 0 8 1 1
Malaysia 17 45 2 4 7 26
Philippines 25 62 5 7 2 10
Thailand 19 52 8 17 2 11
Singapore 44 75 5 5 24 47
Korea 85 93 32 22 17 39
Taiwan 49 23 3
Brazil 26 48 4 3 11 18
Mexico 29 55 4 2 6 33
Greece 50 55 18 31 5 3
Spain 71 73 6 4 26 34
Notes: * on Malaysian GDP indicates 1984 figures. Data for 1988 are derived from
the 1990 issue of World Bank's World Development Report, those for 1977 or
1978 from the 1980 issue, and those for 1981 on labor from the 1985 issue.
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the 1979 OECD report. Let us first examine
the three sets of data on per capita GDP in
Table 5. In tenns of the nominal per capita
GDP in US dollars converted by use of the
current exchange rates for each year, Malaysia
is notable in that by 1978 its per capita GDP
already exceeded US$ 1,100. As mentioned in
section II, the exchange rate conversion is mis-
leading in the case of international comparison
since it does not reflect purchasing power parity
correctly. The exchange rate is also not useful
for comparison over time, since it changes fre-
quently. In fact, the exchange rate is devalued
in most of the countries that experienced zero
or minus growth in nominal per capita GDP in
the first half of the 1980s.
The middle part of Table 5 shows nominal
per capita GDP in 1$ (international dollars) con-
verted by use of purchasing power parities for
each year. This unit should be used in the
multi-country comparison of purchasing power
parities. Its conversion rate with the US$ is
one (1.0), and it depreciates over time in the
case of world inflation. The 1988 data for
ASEAN4 are estimated approximately for refer-
ence purposes. Correct international compari-
son is possible at least for each year based on
the data in the middle part of Table 5. In 1978,
for example, NICs with relatively low income
included Korea (whose per capita income was
22 relative to the US taken as 100), Taiwan
(23) and Brazil (26). Again, Malaysia (23)
attained a comparable level with those coun-
tries. Thailand (14), the Philippines (13), and
Indonesia (8) were far from Korea and Taiwan.
In 1988, the positions of Thailand (16) and
Indonesia (10) remained virtually unchanged
vis-a-vis the United States, but that of the
Philippines (10) had decreased significantly (due
to the debt crisis and its aftennath from 1983 to
1985), becoming closer to that of Indonesia.
The lower part of Table 5 shows real per
capita GDP in international dollars (1$) at con-
stant 1980 prices. These data allow consistent
comparisons both internationally and over time.
In other words, the absolute level of income of
some country in some year can be compared
directly with those of other countries in other
years. For example, Korean per capita GDP in
1978 was 1$ 2,411 (at constant 1980 prices),
while Thai per capita GDP reached 1$ 2,262 (at
constant 1980 prices), more than 90% of the
Korean level in 1978, in 1988. In the case of
Malaysia, its per capita GDP in 1988 (1$ 3,630)
was higher than that of Taiwan in 1985 (1$
3,581) and far higher than those of Korea and
Brazil in 1985 (1$ 3,056 and 1$ 3,282, respec-
tively). As far as income level is concerned,
therefore, Thailand is standing at the threshold
of becoming a NIC, while Malaysia is standing
shoulder to shoulder with some of the NICs.
Indonesia and the Philippines in 1988 attained
almost the same level as Korea and Taiwan in
1970 or a little more than one-half of the level of
two countries in 1978. It will take thirteen
years (i.e., from 1988 to 2001) for the Philip-
pines to attain the Korean income level of 1978,
provided that target GDP growth of 6.5% and
average population growth of 2.5% are realized.
The situation is more or less the same for
Indonesia.
Let us next compare the structure of produc-
tion, employment and exports between
ASEAN4 in recent years and NICs around 1978
(See Table 6). The dividing line between NICs
and other LDCs, according to Balassa's defini-
tion, is a 20% share of the manufacturing sector























15) The following approximate shares are obtained
by combining the data of 1980 and 1988 issues of
World Development Report:
Total exports
ASEAN4 countries increased its share in world
manufacturing exports rapidly from 1978 to
1986 (though the level is still very low). 15) The
second point is whether or not the ASEAN4
countries are adopting an outward-looking pol-
icy for growth. The answer is probably yes. All
of the ASEAN4 countries changed their indus-
trialization strategy by adding "export promo-
tion" to "import substitution" around 1970 (or
the early 1980s in the case of Indonesia) as
mentioned in section II. Such outward-looking
policies also continued during the period of
structural adjustment in the 1980s. The prob-
lem, however, is which was dominant in each
country, the outward-looking policy of export
promotion or the inward-looking policy of im-
port substitution. The third point is whether
the income gap vis-a-vis the industrialized coun-
tries is being rapidly reduced. Table 2 reveals
that per capita GDP growth in the 1980s
(1980-88) was significantly higher only in Thai-
land than in the industrial economies: 3.0% for
Indonesia, 2.0% for Malaysia, -2.4% for the
Philippines and 4.1% for Thailand, compared to
2.1% for the industrial economies. Further-
more, growth rates in Thailand have acceler-
ated remarkably in recent years (1987-89), as
will be discussed later.
The conclusion to which the discussions so
far lead is as follows. As far as the static
quantitative criteria are concerned, it will not be
14) The only exception is Malaysia, where the share
increased to 22% in 1987, which is nevertheless
as low as that of Mexico in 1978.
ASEAN4 except Indonesia had passed this line
by 1988 (see Table 3 for Malaysia where the
share in real tenns was 24% in 1988). In the
share of industrial sectors, including mining,
construction, and public utilities, all of the
ASEAN4 attained the level of Spain or Mexico
in 1988. And in the share of manufacturing
goods in total exports, all of the ASEAN4 ex-
cept Indonesia were at least at the level of
Brazil in 1988 or the level of Singapore and
Taiwan in 1977. The problem here is the
employment structure. The share of industrial
employment is far smaller in ASEAN4 than in
NICs. Though the employment data in Table 6
are only for 1981, the employment structure of
ASEAN4 may be said to have remained almost
unchanged between 1981 and 1988 (or 1987),
judging from the data on manufacturing employ-
ment in Table 3. 14) ASEAN4 clearly lag behind
NICs in the employment structure aspect of
industrialization. This is especially true of labor
absorption by manufacturing industry.
Having conducted a quantitative investigation
of the current situation of ASEAN4 in terms of
the definition of NICs given by OECD [1979]
and Balassa [1981], there still remain three
points to be discussed in relation with the de-
finition of NICs. The first point is the share of
manufacturing industry in both world production
and exports. It is difficult or misleading to
compare production internationally due to fre-
quent changes in exchange rates, but the com-
parison of exports is easier because data on
exports are available in US dollars. A rough
calculation based on World Bank's World De-
velopment Report confirms that each of the
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surprising if Malaysia were classified as a NIC.
When industrialization of its employment struc-
ture progresses further, it will be more reason-
able to classify Malaysia as a NIC, but it re-
mains uncertain whether Malaysia will reduce
its income gap rapidly vis-a-vis the industrial
economies. Thailand is now standing at the
threshold to becoming a NIC. However, its
employment structure lags seriously behind
other aspects of industrialization. Promotion of
labor absorption in the manufacturing industry is
the most crucial problem for Thailand in becom-
ing a NIC. Indonesia and the Philippines seem
unlikely to approach NIC status for at least ten
years. Indonesia is in the process of structural
adjustment towards a less oil-dependent econ-
omy, while the Philippines is also adjusting its
economic structure with a view to achieving
recovery and sustained growth following the
debt crisis and its aftermath.
IV Outlook for the Thai Economy
An important feature of Thai economic de-
velopment is its steady and stable growth in the
postwar period. As Fig. 1 shows, GDP growth
has neither become negative since 1960, nor
has it fallen drastically, even during the world
recession of the early 198Os. The stability and
relatively high growth rates of Thai economic
growth make it conspicuous among those of the
ASEAN4 countries and comparable rather with
Japanese economic growth. The stable growth
may be explained first by the conservative be-
havior or orientation toward stability of Thai
government, which traditionally attaches im-
portance to equilibrium in government budget
and external balance rather than to economic
development. 16) The "built-in-stabilizer" in the
Thai economy, namely the diversification and
drastic change of Thai exports, is also an impor-
tant explanatory factor of its stable growth.
Another important feature of Thai economic
development, whether agricultural or industrial,
is that it has been led by the private sector.
Thai agriculture in the postwar period has a
history of continuous crop change and diver-
sification, adding sugar and maize to the tradi-
tional rice and rubber of the 195Os, adding
tapioca in the 1960s, restoring sugar in the
1970s, and so on. This dynamic adjustment was
borne mainly by Thai farmers, who responded
smartly to prices of inputs and outputs and
other market opportunities. Middlemen played
an important role in bringing market information
to farmers, while government mostly followed
the farmers. 17) Thai industrialization, on the
other hand, was initiated by government under
the "State Enterprises Act" of 1953 and the
"Industry Promotion Act" of 1954, which
caused state enterprises to proliferate in every
field of economic activity from manufacturing to
commerce, banking and service industries. The
change in government in 1958 from prime
minister Phibun to Sarlt, however, brought a
radical change in development strategy from
government-led industrialization to that led by
the private sector. Emphasizing private capital,
direct foreign investment and development
planning as three major factors in development
management, the government began to pursue
industrialization under the new principle of divi-
16) See Warin and Ikemoto [1988: Cbs. 1 & 2 by
Ikemoto] for details on stable growth and con-
servative government policies.
17) See Ammar Siamwalla [1990], Harada [1988],
etc.
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sion of labor between government and the pri-
vate sector, which assigned only such infra-
structural activities as transportation, com-
munication, tourism and national defense to the
government sector, leaving ordinary economic
activities to market mechanisms and the private
sector. This principle has basically been main-
tained throughout the stages of import substitu-
tion and export promotion from the 1960s to
the present. 18)
One problem (or, in a sense, merit) of Thai
industrialization lies in the fact that the employ-
ment share of manufacturing industry did not
rise in line with the production share of that
industry. In other. words, the manufacturing
industry, which produces more than 20% of the
GDP, employs less than 10% of total labor,
while the agricultural sector, which employs
almost 70% of total labor, produces less than
20% ofGDP (See Table 3). This implies low
levels of productivity and income in the agri-
cultural sector relative· to other sectors. It may
also be interpreted as a sacrifice made by agri-
cultural sector for the sake of other sectors by
maintaining a .vast amount of underemployed
labor in rural areas. In Thailand, the problem of
income distribution has been one of the most
important issues to be resolved since the third
five-year economic plan (1972-76), and the
government has actively implemented various
policy measures, such as promotion of rural
industries, regional dispersion of industrialloca-
tions, and assistance to small-scale industries,
in order to reduce the income gap between
rural and urban areas and also between regions.
The main purpose of these policy measures
may be said to be to promote the absorption of
18) See, for example, Suehiro and Yasuda [1987].
surplus or low-income labor from agriculture by
non-agricultural sectors, especially the manufac-
turing industry.
This problem is related to a new concept in
development strategy, namely, NAIC (Newly
Agro-Industrializing Country), which refers to
an export-oriented country whose economy
centers on agriculture, fishery and livestock,
and their processing (i.e., agro-industry). Thai-
land has succeeded in diversifying its agricul-
tural production for export, and is now a major
food-exporting country. But NAIC strategy
seeks more value added by further industrializa-
tion in exports. This strategy seems to be
suitable for the Thai economy which still main-
tains a huge rural population, reflecting the Thai
character of conservative economic manage-
ment aiming at slow but steady progress. The
NAIC strategy, however, should probably be
regarded as transitional and partial, since agro-
industries have only weak linkages with other
industries and their impacts on technology accu-
mulation are relatively small. The sixth eco-
nomic plan (1987-91) emphasizes the machin-
ery industry as being strategic, as well as agro-
industry. The Thai government seems to have
in mind both NAIC status in the short run and
NIC status in the medium or long run. 19)
19) According to the former planning rilinister (See
Snoh Unakul et ale [1990]), Thailand has several
alternatives for her future development path.
One is as a NIC, and another is as a NAIC. The
third is as a NAISE (Newly Agro-Industrializing
Service Economy), which allows also for a lead-
ing role by the service sector in growth. All of
the three are possible alternatives, but each
carries with it new challenges and new problems.
In the case of NIC, for example, the develop-
ment goal of Thailand is to be a healthy NIC
which promises a better life with better income
distribution and better environmental conditions,
but not just a NIC faced with many problems.
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The Thai economy has been growing steadily
since the trough in 1985. Its growth rate in
tenns of GDP was 9.5% in 1987, 13.2% in 1988
and 11. 7% in 1989 (and more than 10% growth
is expected again for 1990). This rapid growth
was led mainly by exports and investment ex-
pansion, behind which lie both external and
internal factors. The external factors are: (1)
dollar depreciation, which also means baht
depreciation; (2) the oil price decline since
1986, (3) the decline in international interest
rates, (4) rising cost pressure in Asian NICs,
and (5) direct foreign investment in export-
oriented projects from japan and Taiwan. The
domestic factors are: (1) development of a wide
range of manufacturing industries consistent
with Thai comparative advantages, and (2)
sound macroeconomic management and political
stability. 20) The most conspicuous factor may
be said to be direct foreign investment, as in
the case of the Malaysian economy. Applied
amounts of foreign investment in Thailand in-
creased by 67% in 1986, by 360% (i.e., 4.6
times) in 1987, and by 140% (i.e., 2.4 times) in
1988. The total amount of applied foreign in-
vestment is 394 billion bahts (!) in 1988 (accord-
ing to BOI data, but only 28 billion bahts
according to BOT data for net direct foreign
investment). Among foreign investors, japan is
dominant in value, followed by Taiwan.
japanese investment covers a wide range of
industries, such as electric appliances, electron-
ics, transportation equipment, metal products,
textiles, and agricultural and fishery products.
Furthennore, three-quarters of its applications
were export-oriented ones with export ratios
ranging from 80% to 100%. Taiwanese invest-
20) See World Bank [1989] for details.
ment, on the other hand, concentrates on labor
intensive, export-oriented, light-industry prod-
ucts such as sports goods, shoes, and bags, in
which Taiwan has lost its international competi-
tiveness. It must be noted that these direct
foreign investments are now shifting from
Bangkok to remote prefectures in accordance
with the changing investment incentives, by
which the Thai government is attempting to
avoid excessive concentration in the Bangkok
area and to realize balanced development be-
tween regions. 21)
Manufacturing industry surpassed the agri-
cultural sector (to be more precise, the primary
sector) in tenns of production in 1984 and in
tenns of exports in 1987. As to the structure of
employment, agricultural labor maintained a
constant share of around 70% until 1984, which
began to decrease from 1985 and is now a little
over 60%. The foreign investment boom in
recent years will surely accelerate this decline.
Indeed, a symptom of labor shortage has
already been observed by the World Bank.
Accelerated growth in recent years will rapidly
reduce the income gap vis-a-vis the industrial-
ized countries. The Thai economy seems to be
moving dynamically toward NIC status, having
passed, as it were, the 'turning point' in the
theory of dualistic development. 22),23)
21) Data above are obtained mainly from JETRO
[1989; 1990].
22) Warr and Bandid [1987] review eighty articles by
the Thai authors on the Thai economy published
up to the year 1986. The consensus among
these Thai economists (until 1986) was that
"Thailand is definitely not a NIC, even a near-
NIC."
23) Snoh Unakul et al. [1990] investigates the NIC
status for Thailand based mainly on Balassa's
definition, allowing for the following four criteria :
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